A atenção intencional na teoria da cognição de Pedro de João Olivi

• Ano de defesa: 2015
• Autor(a) principal: Cenci, Márcio Paulo
• Orientador(a): Pich, Roberto Hofmeister
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Departamento: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: FILOSOFIA; OLIVI, PIERRE JEAN - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; INTENCIONALIDADE; COGNIÇÃO
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/2950

This doctoral thesis aims to show that intentional attention is a pre-experiential element necessary to perceptual cognitive act. Peter John Olivi (1248 / 9-1298) supports the idea that intentional attention must be used as the condition for the active performance of perceptual cognitive act. Describing the type of access that the mind has of external objects is a principle of perceptual cognition theory. The hypothesis presented uses the theory of matter, the theory of soul and the theory of soul s potencies as a base for the theory of intentional attention. So, this work presents how Olivi elaborates a peculiar theory of matter and distinguishes corporal of spiritual matters (Chapter 1). Thus, especially in cognizant human beings, this distinction requires some explanation about the connection between spiritual matter and corporal matter. The theory of the human soul (Chapter 2) explains the union between body and mind and between the soul s potencies. In fact, Olivi s solution depends on the acceptance of a theory where the formal parts of the soul are linked under a principle of subordination and continuity (Chapter 3). Besides that, the necessity of intentional attention at the moment of the power orientation for this or that object is noticed in the performance of sensorial soul s potencies. However, this attention is a characteristic of mode of common sense action applied in the acts of the external senses. Therefore, the theoretical elements that are presupposed systematically for the treatment of intentional attention are given. The connection between attention and intentionality is the subject of the last and decisive chapter (Chapter 4). The intentionality is a natural component of sensory apprehension, but in Olivi it requires an active nature of the soul, since the intentional performance is essential to the soul and it is independent of intermediate representational elements such as species. Olivi does not reduce the cognitive act to active or passive mode of action, but adds the terminative cause as a function of object in the act of production. Then, the termination is crucial to show how cognitive attention is classified as intentional. Finally, the intentional attention as the condition which ensures immediate access to the external world objects is presented.