Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2010 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Campelo, Olívia Brandão Melo
 |
| Orientador(a): |
Pugliesi, Marcio |
| Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
|
| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
|
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Estudos Pós-Graduados em Direito
|
| Departamento: |
Faculdade de Direito
|
| País: |
BR
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: |
|
| Palavras-chave em Inglês: |
|
| Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
|
| Link de acesso: |
https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/8926
|
Resumo: |
Introduction: Phrônesis, word that comes from the Greek, meaning the exercise of a capacity to apply truths about what is good for a certain type of person, people in general, in certain situations, for themselves in particular occasions. This term can be brought by prudence in which is a virtue that when applied to the concrete case has a human character by being contingent and variable depending on individuals and circumstances. Phrônesis was used by Aristotle during the construction of his theory of justice. In the Aristotelian prudence, all theoretical significance is removed in order to avoid more than one type of moral being, capable of orienting the action in the path which is considered fair. Aristoteles insisted on the vocation practice of this term and concerned himself in the direction which the human actions considered fair and virtuous should be guided with prudence General Objective: Analyze the Aristotelian prudence as a determinant factor of obtaining justice. Specific Objectives: Identify the direction of the Aristotelian justice; analyze the Aristotelian prudence present in the Ethics to Nicomacus; and verify in what way the prudence is a determinant in justice practice. Methodology: bibliographic and qualitative research. Expected Results: The demonstration that the prudence is not only an important criterion of justice, since is considered a sort of moral sense, presumes that all decisions that have as the end justice should observe the practical intelligence, under penalty of commit the effectiveness of the real justice |
