A fórmula do mundo segundo Karl Popper
Ano de defesa: | 2009 |
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Autor(a) principal: | |
Orientador(a): | |
Banca de defesa: | |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Idioma: | por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul
Porto Alegre |
Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Palavras-chave em Português: | |
Link de acesso: | http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3421 |
Resumo: | This thesis claim to defend the following argument: the Popper’s philosophy, primarily because of his cosmological interest, can only be properly understood as a system, like this, the total explanation of reality is understood in two basic points: Metaphysics; and Theory of Knowledge. In Chapter I, we will argue that, the basis of modern science is Copernicus and Galileo. The first one doe’s not discuss concrete problems or observational data, in the language of the heliocentric Popper, like any other scientific theory, the result is a creative intuition; this intuition has generated a theory that is validity from its explanatory power, which deducts some predictions that we can test. Popper noticed that when he overthrow the Newtonian mechanics, he affirmed the ingredient of ontological realism, and the thesis of verisimilitude - though intuitive form. In Chapter II we will try to argue that the modern answers - Hume and Kant - presupposed, though for different reasons, the mechanism: Hume as ontological basis for their psychological inductive inferences, which, say, in passing, is untenable, and Kant in its synthetic judgments a priori. The answer of Logical Positivism had serious difficulties in its base: the idea that scientific discourse is itself self-sustaining, because from the inductive method transformed into scientific laws: a) From poor sense, because its inference is not logically justifiable; b) Rules for the formation of language, similar to rules of inference, which does not help because the rationale of rules of inference in the deduction is given for its ability of transmitting truth, that is, based on these rules of inference will never have true premises and false conclusions, such as induction does not allow it. c) Predictive tools, which remove the descriptive aspect of science. In Chapter III we seek to argue that the fallibility deductible, as we are interpreting, acknowledges in the statement refuting from Einstein, an independent world, and the idea of knowledge as a process governed by conjectures and refutations. Upon a finding of asymmetry between the universal hypotheses intuitively created and set out basic deductible of them, understood as distorting their potential, we have a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science perfectly framed in cosmology – this is the central concern of Popper. In Chapter IV we will examine how, from the years 50 and 60, Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend also criticize the philosophy of science, with was inspired on neopositivism, trying to demonstrate that a purely formal analysis, when extended to the history of science, it is insufficient. Two are the basic points of attack: the induction and the idea that science rests on an infallible empirical basis. In spite all build their theories from the history of science are, first of all, philosophers, we can say that his criticism of Popper is focused primarily on the following point: the overlap between theory-hand experiences does not allow for a rational solution the problem of empirical basis. We argue that when we propose to accept the recognition of Metaphysics realistic, this criticism can be overcome on a relatively quiet, can do this without a dive in search of legitimacy in the history of science. In Chapter V we recognize that, if we had until now argued that while metaphysical realism is a necessary assumption of the epistemology of Popper, it is acknowledged that this reality is given independent of regularities, making it necessary to reconcile 'Realism' and 'Indefinite', mediate the term 'propensity'.The Three Worlds are released from here to an evolutionary perspective, which will be a starting point the idea that all organisms are constantly immersed in the resolution of problems, problems which are not restricted just to survive. By a process of trial and error, the whole nature is homogeneous, rooted in the specific human capacity to develop a descriptive language and argumentative. The ability to produce the language establishing the M 3 and the concomitant possibility of formation of the human subject as ' I 'conscious. |