A crítica de Hegel ao formalismo moral Kantiano

• Ano de defesa: 2011
• Autor(a) principal: Müller, Rudinei
• Orientador(a): Weber, Thadeu
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul; Porto Alegre
• Palavras-chave em Português: FILOSOFIA; FILOSOFIA ALEMÃ; RAZÃO (FILOSOFIA); DIALÉTICA; KANT, IMMANUEL - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3511

Hegel‟s criticism of the formalism of Kantian morality is an issue which may be approached from different angles. The present thesis aims at demonstrating that, in Kant‟s as well as in Hegel's philosophy, the paramount arguments in regards to formalism (Kant) and the necessity of overcoming it (Hegel) are elaborated on in the speculative philosophy. Hegel‟s critical superiority in relation to Kant consists of its radicalism. It is demonstrated how Hegel claims that the very finite, the phenomenon, is already a sort of non non-finite, revealing its internal contradiction which, when exposed, reveals the substantiality, the true infinite in which both opposite moments, finite and infinite, are true. The determined being already contains in its own destination a must-be, overcoming the Kantian separation, exclusion and opposition between being and must-be. The supreme criterion of Kantian morality, the categorical imperative, is, according to Hegel, empty, formal, analytical and tautological. Thus, an absolutely formal moral criterion may state, in regards to the axiom, what has always been stated. It is incapable of adding any new information to the synthetic form. Whatever the formula says about the axiom is already contained in the axiom; therefore, it does not state anything new. Hence, theft cannot be justified, because the word “theft” is already determined by its very context, in which taking hold of someone else‟s possession is theft. For Hegel, however, due to the superiority of reason over understanding, even if theft is still theft, it is possible, under certain circumstances, to rationally justify it without eliminating the rule or incurring in arbitrariness. It is the understanding of the difference between the principles and the rules which allows, with Hegel, but only under certain circumstances, to ethically justify the exception.