Liberdade: Hegel e os contrapontos de Ernst Tugendhat e Isaiah Berlin

• Ano de defesa: 2010
• Autor(a) principal: Emery, Emerson Baldotto
• Orientador(a): Luft, Eduardo
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul; Porto Alegre
• Palavras-chave em Português: FILOSOFIA ALEMÃ; LIBERDADE (FILOSOFIA); HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; TUGENDHAT, ERNST - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; BERLIN, ISAIAH - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3527

This study describes and analyzes Hegel‟s concept of freedom posing it to de focus of two of his critics: Ernst Tugendhat and Isaiah Berlin. The objective is to understand the implications of the concepts exposed to the current reality, as an instrument for interpreting the limits of individual and social freedom present in modern societies. The main analysis is made over the Hegel‟s system of practical philosophy, which shows the concept of freedom as the realization of the Absolute Spirit that only reach the fullness in the stage of social development by the state. It is a vision that exalts the achievements and the possibilities of the human being, but, restrict the free action by the submission of the negative liberty to positive freedom, represented by the self-determination of the rational agent. The confrontation of the Hegel‟s ideas with Tugendhat‟s and Berlin‟s conceptions, lighten the ways in which the argument of a strict rational solution reaches an authoritarian outcome, contrary to the current concept of freedom. For Berlin the monism must be refuted and there are at least two forms of freedom, negative and positive, the first is a condition for the second. Tugendhat alert to the impossibility of social and moral life under the Hegel‟s freedom, asserting the inexistence of any society when lacking the concept of responsibility, that is extinguished by the extreme limitation or the inexistence of choices. Affirm that Hegel replace the decision by reflection by the trust in the ethic Estate, the free hegelian man doesn‟t make decision, obey, jettisoning his moral conscience to consider only the law. The conclusion shows that the three authors do not believe that the necessitarianism is plausible, based on your accomplishment would make many meaningless many aspects of social life known to humankind, and verify in history an increasing complexity of the concept of freedom for its practical application, as a result of the interweaving of that freedom with the conditions of freedom and an increase in the size of what today might be considered a minimum requirement for the realization of what is to be free. Notes that the limits to the exercise of freedom are not as extensive as previously thought which makes room for speculation of a new monist concept of moral.