Ceticismo, contextualismo e a transmissão de justificação

• Ano de defesa: 2007
• Autor(a) principal: Borges, Rodrigo Martins
• Orientador(a): Almeida, Cláudio Gonçalves de
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul; Porto Alegre
• Palavras-chave em Português: CEPTICISMO (FILOSOFIA); CONTEXTUALISMO (FILOSOFIA); JUSTIFICAÇÃO (FILOSOFIA); EPISTEMOLOGIA
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3387

The present text discusses the contemporary treatment given to one of the central topics in epistemology: the problem of skepticism. In order to do so, some of the most important responses to skepticism are analyzed in detail. The first chapter analyzes the structure of the skeptical argument and the tenability of the two epistemic principles upon which it depends. The closer principle and the principle of underdetermination are defended from the main objections against them and, consequently, all attempted refutation of the skeptical argument which utilize this strategy are considered unsatisfactory. Chapter two analyzes the tentative refutation of the skeptical argument put forward by peter Klein. Though Klein’s proposal is attractive it is considered inadequate. Chapter three discusses Fred Dretske’s theory of relevant alternatives and its limitations. Chapter four analyzes two versions of the answer to skepticism which is the most discussed – contextualism. The contextualist versions present by Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose are made explicit and considered, on the light of strong objections, unacceptable. In the concluding remarks I present an original response to the skeptical problem which utilizes the notions – proposed by Roy Sorensen – of ‘junk knowledge’ and of ‘robust knowledge’. This solution pretends to fulfill a plausible set of conditions imposed by contextualists (e. g., Keith DeRose) to any solution of the skeptical problem which makes use of something that became known as ‘warranted assertability manoeuvre. ’