Governança corporativa e custo de agência: uma visão do mercado brasileiro

• Ano de defesa: 2016
• Autor(a) principal: Rodrigues, Vitor Hugo Medeiros
• Orientador(a): Sanvicente, Antonio Zoratto
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Custo de agência; Mecanismos de monitoramento interno
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16740

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between agency cost and internal monitoring corporate governance mechanisms available to Brazilian investors in local companies, using samples of listed companies for the 2010-2014 period, totaling 134 companies and 536 observations. To measure this relationship, we used as internal monitoring variables, information about variable executive compensation, including stock options, board composition, with emphasis on the presence of independent directors and the duality between Chairman and CEO, and the percentage of the equity of the company held by managers. As a proxy for agency cost, Asset Turnover Ratio and General & Administrative Expenses (G&A) as a percentage of net revenue were used. Two research hypotheses were proposed and regression models utilizing panel data were estimated, controlling for time and company fixed effects, using as dependent variables the two proxy variables for agency cost. The results show that, for the selected sample, there is a significant and positive relationship between the percentage of variable compensation and the agency cost proxies, which is conflict with what was originally expected. It is concluded that companies that have a higher variable compensation proportions incur in higher agency costs, leading to the conclusion that such a tool is not adequate for aligning of interests between executives and shareholders. The other internal monitoring variables were found not to be significant.