Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2003 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Garcia, Paulo Cerqueira |
| Orientador(a): |
Linhares, Alexandre |
| Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
|
| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: |
|
| Link de acesso: |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/3925
|
Resumo: |
This dissertation attempts to assess the Industrial Maintenance contracting ways that have been mn for recent years, sorting key-figures that must be taken into consideration in a performance based maintenance contract, variable reimbursable and risk clauses. These issues will be presented by two different points of view: from purchasers (industries) and from service suppliers (specialized companies). In order to reach the new model, this research makes use of a kid's game, named gallows (a game based on trial and fault, where the player has to guess a word that the administrator thought, but keep hidden, spelling letter by letter). The text describes a direct link between this game's methodology and the trial and fault system that industries and service suppliers have worked in order to close (and run) current long terms maintenance contracts. After that, the research tried to appoint the main success factors that could set the players (service and industry) to work in same direction - a strategic alliance. The research methodology was based on oriented questionnaires that had sent to the highest management leveI of industries and service suppliers. |
