Serviços de saúde, a assimetria da informação e a intervenção do governo: os exemplos americano e brasileiro

• Ano de defesa: 2014
• Autor(a) principal: Nicolini, Miquelina da Fonseca
• Orientador(a): Costa, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa da
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Seguro de saúde; Distribuição de renda em espécie; Autoseleção; Health services; Health insurance; Inkind transfer; Self-selection; Serviços de saúde; Seleção adversa
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Adverse selection
• Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/13792

The current essay shows how health service market is afected by assimetric information, that results in government intervention. To understand that, an analisis of how this market works has been done, taking in account assimetric information, specially the one brought by adverse selection, shown in Akerlof’s and Rothschild and Stiglitz’s models. Then, specificities of health market were discussed and the intervention of government, justified. At this point, the income distribution that comes from the government intervention is also approached. Finally, as an example, Brazil’s and United States’ models are shown and analised. As a conclusion, the implication of each one of these models, as well as sugestions for another studies in this area.