Governança,alavancagem e ciclicidade: a eficiência do modelo brasileiro de private equity

• Ano de defesa: 2010
• Autor(a) principal: Inocima, Fabio Massao
• Orientador(a): Souza, André Portela Fernandes de
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Finanças; Teoria das decisões financeiras; Comitê de investimentos; Compra alavancada; Aquisições alavancadas; Estrutura de capital; Leveraged buy-out (lbo); Governança
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Venture capital
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/5909

This work seeks to analyze the efficiency of the investment committees of the FIPs (Fundos de Investimento em Participações), the most relevant investment vehicle of the Brazilian private equity industry, taking into consideration that acquisitions made by these vehicles are not leveraged. Such analysis is made by comparing it with the American model, which usually delegates the investment decision to the general partner and employs a significant amount of leverage when acquiring a target. Initially, a non-exhaustive review of the Brazilian papers on private equity is conducted. Next, the particularities of the Brazilian model are pointed out, specially the investment decisions shared by fund managers and investors, and the scarce usage of leverage in the acquisitions, and it is shown how these characteristics affect the equilibrium of Axelson, Strömberg and Weisbach’s model. The conclusion is that the particularities of the FIPs model offer: (i) better protection to the limited partners’ interests and (ii) allow the general partners to take advantage of the period when the transactions occur at lower multiples, resulting in a more efficient investment model with a countercyclical nature. However, such conclusions are subject to the compliance of the following premises: (i) the investment committee must have qualifications as good as, or better than, those of the general partner, (ii) it must have enough time and personnel availability to analyze the opportunities as deeply as the general partner does, (iii) the existence of the investment committee must not result in a competitive disadvantage for the limited partner in terms of agility in the negotiation processes. Finally, some potential situations of conflicts of interests of the committee members are raised.