Conhecimento e Sensitividade
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| প্রকাশনার তারিখ: | 2020 |
| বিন্যাস: | Doctoral thesis |
| ভাষা: | por |
| সম্পদ: | Repositório Comum do Brasil - Deposita |
| Download full: | https://deposita.ibict.br/handle/deposita/477 |
সংক্ষিপ্ত: | The subject matter of this dissertation is the nature of empirical knowledge. My view is that knowledge is at least sensitive true belief: one that the subject wouldn?t form or hold were it was false, but he would form it or hold it were it was true. I will argue that sensitivity is better understood functionalism, a true belief is knowledge only if (i) it is formed by a cognitive mechanism functioning properly (ii) in a proper environment, and this mechanism (iii) has to aim truth, (iv) having the tendency to produce more true beliefs than false ones, and (v) no defeater being available. I think that conditions (i) and (ii) can?t be adequately stated unless we take into account the sensitivity condition. The same is true for sensitivity: its better formulation is stated when we consider (i) and (ii). Roughly, I will argue that the sensitivity of one?s belief is a matter of its responsiveness to truth due to the proper function of one?s cognitive mechanism in a favorable environment: an environment where the subject wouldn?t form or hold the belief were it was false, but he would believe it were it was true. I begin, in Chapter I, with the following desideratum: to provide an anti-luck condition to knowledge. I argue that sensitivity is the main candidate to such condition. In Chapter II the standard version of sensitivity and some of the main difficulties to it are presented. Then, in Chapter III, I propose to understand sensitivity as inherent to proper functionalism and reply to the difficulties previously presented. A rival of sensitivity, the safety condition, is discussed in Chapter IV. I defend sensitivity over safety. Finally, in Chapter V, another important desideratum to any theory of knowledge is taken in consideration: skepticism. The adoption of sensitivity provides an attractive way to respond to skeptical argument, but at the coast of the rejection of closure principle, a very plausible epistemic principle. I will argue that we can adopt a restrict version of closure and that this restriction is predicted by sensitivity. |
| _version_ | 1872168167410761728 |
|---|---|
| author | Marques Segundo, L. H. |
| author_browse | Marques Segundo, L. H. |
| author_facet | Marques Segundo, L. H. |
| author_role | author |
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| collection | Repositório Comum do Brasil - Deposita |
| contributor_str_mv | Luz, Alexandre |
| dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv | Luz, Alexandre |
| dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv | Marques Segundo, L. H. |
| dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv | http://lattes.cnpq.br/1531118741977108 |
| dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv | 2024-01-10T18:37:31Z |
| dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv | 2020 |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv | application/pdf application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv | https://deposita.ibict.br/handle/deposita/477 |
| dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv | por |
| dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv | Brasil |
| dc.publisher.department.fl_str_mv | Departamento de Filosofia |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| dc.publisher.program.fl_str_mv | Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia |
| dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:Repositório Comum do Brasil - Deposita instname:Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia (Ibict) instacron:IBICT |
| dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv | Epistemologia |
| dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv | Teoria contrafactual do conhecimento Sensitividade Epistemologia da função apropriada Ceticismo e fechamento |
| dc.title.alternative.por.fl_str_mv | Knowledge and Sensitivity |
| dc.title.por.fl_str_mv | Conhecimento e Sensitividade |
| dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| dc.type.status.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | The subject matter of this dissertation is the nature of empirical knowledge. My view is that knowledge is at least sensitive true belief: one that the subject wouldn?t form or hold were it was false, but he would form it or hold it were it was true. I will argue that sensitivity is better understood functionalism, a true belief is knowledge only if (i) it is formed by a cognitive mechanism functioning properly (ii) in a proper environment, and this mechanism (iii) has to aim truth, (iv) having the tendency to produce more true beliefs than false ones, and (v) no defeater being available. I think that conditions (i) and (ii) can?t be adequately stated unless we take into account the sensitivity condition. The same is true for sensitivity: its better formulation is stated when we consider (i) and (ii). Roughly, I will argue that the sensitivity of one?s belief is a matter of its responsiveness to truth due to the proper function of one?s cognitive mechanism in a favorable environment: an environment where the subject wouldn?t form or hold the belief were it was false, but he would believe it were it was true. I begin, in Chapter I, with the following desideratum: to provide an anti-luck condition to knowledge. I argue that sensitivity is the main candidate to such condition. In Chapter II the standard version of sensitivity and some of the main difficulties to it are presented. Then, in Chapter III, I propose to understand sensitivity as inherent to proper functionalism and reply to the difficulties previously presented. A rival of sensitivity, the safety condition, is discussed in Chapter IV. I defend sensitivity over safety. Finally, in Chapter V, another important desideratum to any theory of knowledge is taken in consideration: skepticism. The adoption of sensitivity provides an attractive way to respond to skeptical argument, but at the coast of the rejection of closure principle, a very plausible epistemic principle. I will argue that we can adopt a restrict version of closure and that this restriction is predicted by sensitivity. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | doctoralThesis |
| id | IBICT-1_c82d0b8b0233b4dd8cf330a82f254f28 |
| instacron_str | IBICT |
| institution | IBICT |
| instname_str | Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia (Ibict) |
| language | por |
| network_acronym_str | IBICT-1 |
| network_name_str | Repositório Comum do Brasil - Deposita |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:deposita.ibict.br:deposita/477 |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| reponame_str | Repositório Comum do Brasil - Deposita |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | deposita@ibict.br |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | Repositório Comum do Brasil - Deposita - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia (Ibict) |
| repository_id_str | 4658 |
| spelling | Luz, Alexandrehttp://lattes.cnpq.br/1531118741977108Marques Segundo, L. H.2024-01-10T18:37:31Z2020https://deposita.ibict.br/handle/deposita/477The subject matter of this dissertation is the nature of empirical knowledge. My view is that knowledge is at least sensitive true belief: one that the subject wouldn?t form or hold were it was false, but he would form it or hold it were it was true. I will argue that sensitivity is better understood functionalism, a true belief is knowledge only if (i) it is formed by a cognitive mechanism functioning properly (ii) in a proper environment, and this mechanism (iii) has to aim truth, (iv) having the tendency to produce more true beliefs than false ones, and (v) no defeater being available. I think that conditions (i) and (ii) can?t be adequately stated unless we take into account the sensitivity condition. The same is true for sensitivity: its better formulation is stated when we consider (i) and (ii). Roughly, I will argue that the sensitivity of one?s belief is a matter of its responsiveness to truth due to the proper function of one?s cognitive mechanism in a favorable environment: an environment where the subject wouldn?t form or hold the belief were it was false, but he would believe it were it was true. I begin, in Chapter I, with the following desideratum: to provide an anti-luck condition to knowledge. I argue that sensitivity is the main candidate to such condition. In Chapter II the standard version of sensitivity and some of the main difficulties to it are presented. Then, in Chapter III, I propose to understand sensitivity as inherent to proper functionalism and reply to the difficulties previously presented. A rival of sensitivity, the safety condition, is discussed in Chapter IV. I defend sensitivity over safety. Finally, in Chapter V, another important desideratum to any theory of knowledge is taken in consideration: skepticism. The adoption of sensitivity provides an attractive way to respond to skeptical argument, but at the coast of the rejection of closure principle, a very plausible epistemic principle. I will argue that we can adopt a restrict version of closure and that this restriction is predicted by sensitivity.O assunto principal desta tese é a natureza do conhecimento empírico. Penso que conhecimento seja, pelo menos, crença verdadeira sensitiva: uma crença que não seria formada ou sustentada pelo sujeito caso fosse falsa, mas formada ou sustentada caso verdadeira. Defenderei mais especificamente a tese de que a sensitividade é melhor compreendida no interior da teoria da função apropriada. De acordo com a epistemologia da função apropriada, uma crença verdadeira conta como conhecimento somente se (i) for produzida por um mecanismo funcionando apropriadamente, (ii) num ambiente adequado, (iii) tal mecanismo visar a verdade, (iv) tender a produzir mais crenças verdadeiras do que falsas, e (v) não houver anuladores. Penso que as condições (i) e (ii) só podem ser satisfatoriamente formuladas levando-se em conta a sensitividade, ao mesmo tempo que a sensitividade encontra a sua melhor formulação quando levadas em conta (i) e (ii). Grosso modo, defenderei que a sensitividade é uma questão da crença do sujeito ser responsiva à verdade por ser produto de um mecanismo cognitivo funcionando num ambiente favorável: um ambiente no qual ele não formaria tal crença caso tal crença fosse falsa, mas que, caso verdadeira, a formaria. Começarei, no Capítulo I, com o seguinte desideratum: oferecer uma condição anti-sorte ao conhecimento. Argumento que a sensitividade é a principal candidata à condição anti-sorte. No Capítulo II apresento a versão clássica da sensitividade e algumas de suas principais dificuldades. No Capítulo III, proponho a sensitividade como inerente à epistemologia da função apropriada e respondo às dificuldades levantadas no capítulo anterior. No capítulo IV, discuto uma condição anti-sorte rival, a segurança, e argumento que a sensitividade é superior. Por fim, no Capítulo V, trato de outro desideratum importante a qualquer teoria do conhecimento, o ceticismo. A adoção da sensitividade fornece uma resposta atraente ao ceticismo, ainda que amplamente considerada implausível, uma vez que parece violar um princípio epistêmico plausível, o princípio de fechamento. Argumentarei que podemos manter um princípio restrito de fechamento e que a sensitividade explica por que podemos fazer tal restrição.CapesSudeste-1application/pdfapplication/pdfporUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrograma de Pós-graduação em FilosofiaBrasilDepartamento de FilosofiaTeoria contrafactual do conhecimentoSensitividadeEpistemologia da função apropriadaCeticismo e fechamentoEpistemologiaConhecimento e SensitividadeKnowledge and Sensitivityinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Comum do Brasil - Depositainstname:Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia (Ibict)instacron:IBICTTEXTPFIL0374-T.pdf.txtWritten by FormatFilter org.dspace.app.mediafilter.TikaTextExtractionFilter on 2025-06-06T20:14:08Z (GMT).Extracted texttext/plain103300https://deposita.ibict.br/bitstreams/5b02876b-2551-4133-90d5-e23839c0c65b/download8fc3c2c0c778f36ac0d534ca7988b383MD53falseAnonymousREADTHUMBNAILPFIL0374-T.pdf.jpgWritten by FormatFilter org.dspace.app.mediafilter.PDFBoxThumbnail on 2025-06-06T20:14:08Z (GMT).Generated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2648https://deposita.ibict.br/bitstreams/8c615a91-4feb-4354-a89c-bea030f7c7d5/downloada369ec016f0924ea553b3bcd9deb0b71MD54falseAnonymousREADLICENSElicense.txtWritten by org.dspace.content.LicenseUtilstext/plain; charset=utf-81867https://deposita.ibict.br/bitstreams/259f82e6-a825-431b-a23f-0c51af1da0a0/downloada7c148eec59885ba1ba6d14692be8465MD51falseAnonymousREADORIGINALPFIL0374-T.pdf/dspace/deposita/upload/PFIL0374-T.pdfdocumento principalapplication/pdf2445580https://deposita.ibict.br/bitstreams/9cbbb9f5-b83d-439f-a529-6c0388ce98eb/downloadcffc7c87490ffeb9601d2a32c78a3c3dMD52trueAnonymousREADdeposita/4772026-03-20T17:39:22.576229Zopen.accessoai:deposita.ibict.br:deposita/477https://deposita.ibict.brRepositório ComumPUBhttp://deposita.ibict.br/oai/requestdeposita@ibict.bropendoar:46582026-03-20T17:39:22Repositório Comum do Brasil - Deposita - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia (Ibict)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 |
| spellingShingle | Conhecimento e Sensitividade Marques Segundo, L. H. Teoria contrafactual do conhecimento Sensitividade Epistemologia da função apropriada Ceticismo e fechamento Epistemologia |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Conhecimento e Sensitividade |
| title_full | Conhecimento e Sensitividade |
| title_fullStr | Conhecimento e Sensitividade |
| title_full_unstemmed | Conhecimento e Sensitividade |
| title_short | Conhecimento e Sensitividade |
| title_sort | Conhecimento e Sensitividade |
| topic | Teoria contrafactual do conhecimento Sensitividade Epistemologia da função apropriada Ceticismo e fechamento Epistemologia |
| url | https://deposita.ibict.br/handle/deposita/477 |